Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the

time.

I note with regret that the President, who once pledged to the world

that no American ground troops would be deployed, now refuses to pledge

to seek congressional approval before such a massive deployment.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose this rule because the last paragraph of

it nullifies the War Powers Act until the end of this century, and the

War Powers Act is a tool we may need to influence policy.

There are those who argue against any congressional involvement in

the grave decision that lies ahead. They say that our enemies will

tremble in fear if one man, without congressional approval, can deploy

100,000 American soldiers.

Well, Mr. Speaker, I tremble in fear and the Founders of this

Republic would tremble in fear if they thought that one man, without

congressional approval, could send 100,000 of our men and women into

battle.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to

me.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to make some general comments about our

position in Kosovo, and then focus on the resolutions that are before

us today.

Some think that this is a stark choice, that we must either ignore

the refugees of Kosovo and ignore the fact that America's credibility

and NATO's credibility is on the line, or we must, instead, commit

ground forces and incur hundreds, perhaps thousands, of American

casualties.

I think we do need to focus on other options. One of those is to

train, though not necessarily arm, a force of Albanians perhaps

independent of the KLA. Then when Milosevic reviews the situation, he

will see that he is up not only against the most powerful air armada

ever assembled, not only against a ragtag band of lightly armed KLA

guerrillas, but also will soon be up against a force of heavily armed

Albanians with tanks and heavy artillery willing to take casualties.

We need to enlist the Russians in negotiating a settlement. I would

suggest that that settlement would provide that 20 percent or so of

Kosovo would be patrolled by a Russian peacekeeping force, and that

some 80 percent would be patrolled by a NATO peacekeeping force.

The ultimate resolution of Kosovo could be decided later.

I see that my good friend and ranking member, the gentleman from

Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), has returned to the Chamber, and I

discussed with him earlier the meaning of his own resolution, which I

know he intends, or is at least allowed by the rule, to introduce later

today. I would like to have a colloquy with the gentleman, because it

has been argued that the legal effect of his resolution, as interpreted

by a court, his resolution is an authorization by Congress to send a

large ground force into Kosovo or as waiving any of Congress' rights

with regard to such a deployment.

And should any court interpret it as a congressional

authorization to use any other kind of force?

Mr. Speaker, I will look forward to further

clarification.

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from

California (Mr. Campbell) for bringing this issue to a head. We have

cast and will cast momentous votes for today.

I think it is important that we clarify the record. We voted for the

Goodling-Fowler bill. I should point out that distributed to virtually

every Member of this House by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs.

Fowler) was a statement in writing that should be part of the record,

that says in part that this bill does not prevent the use of Apache

helicopters and does not preclude the introduction of small numbers of

personnel for intelligence or targeting functions.

I think that our adoption of that resolution, at least by this House,

made sense. I know there are those who argue that Congress should not

be involved in the momentous decision that lies ahead, but as I have

said before, those who say that our enemies should tremble in fear

because one man should be allowed to deploy 100,000 American soldiers,

should be answered that Americans should tremble in fear if one man

without congressional approval can deploy 100,000 men and women into

battle.

I should point out that the President of the United States

distributed to all Members of Congress today a letter stating, in part,

that he would ask for congressional support before introducing U.S.

ground forces into Kosovo, into a nonpermissive environment.

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) will be bringing up a

matter later today. It has been interpreted by some as more than a mere

authorization of the air campaign but

it states, and I interpret it, as providing only support for the air

campaign and not a legal authorization for more.

I would hope that any wise court would look at the record today. A

letter from the President saying he will not put in ground troops, a

vote by this House not to put in ground troops. Under those

circumstances, a wise court should interpret the Gejdenson resolution

as nothing more than what it states.

Mr. Speaker, this has been a momentous day. And it is

important that the Nation, and especially the leaders in Belgrade, do

not misinterpret what happened here.

America will continue the air war, and that air war has the support

of this House. America demands the resettlement of the Kosovars in

safety in Kosovo, and that has overwhelming support. And that is all

indicated by our rejection of the resolution to withdraw all military

efforts from the Yugoslav theater.

We also voted clearly, and the White House should not misconstrue

this, that before massive ground forces are deployed, Congress must be

consulted.

And finally, in what I fear will be a confusing vote, and I use this

speech to avoid such confusion, we voted 213-213 on a resolution that

seemed restricted to the air war, but those who understand our legal

system will recognize that the reason we voted that way was to make

sure our own courts did not misinterpret that vote as a vote in favor

of a carte blanche to the President. We support the air war by a large

vote in this House.